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Evolutionary Causation, the new edited book from Tobias Uller and Kevin Laland 
(Uller and Laland, 2019) should be seen as a positive contribution to those 
seeking an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES).  The ambition for an EES has 
emerged most vociferously over the past 15 years, but its antecedents stretch 
back to the key work in the 1970s of Gould, Lewontin and their colleagues.  At 
root arguments for an EES are arguments about how the Modern Synthesis (MS) 
in evolutionary biology has been found wanting.  Much of this discontent has 
been to do with theoreticians rethinking concepts of adaptation, inheritance and 
development (Jablonka and Lamb, 2006; Huneman and Walsh, 2017) as well as 
variation and macroevolution (Pigliucci and Muller, 2010).  This book continues 
this work, but focuses on analysis of the central concept of causation within 
evolution. 
 
2. What is the MS? 
 
Elsewhere I have defined the MS as a framework for generating hypotheses 
((Dickins and Dickins, 2018) and see Otsula, chapter 12). One way to 
characterize this framework is through its history.  A standard view is that the MS 
emerged from the 1930s through the 1960s as a synthesis between the 
Darwinian theory of evolution and the Mendelian theory of inheritance, mediated 
by the advent of population genetics (Provine, 2001). 
 
Whilst it increasingly clear that this gloss fails to capture the messy and to some 
extent unresolved details of the development of thought within evolutionary 
biology (Delisle, 2009, 2011) it captures an ideal philosophical structure.  The MS 
is a response to something entailed by Darwinian evolution.  Thus, Darwin’s 
contribution was not only the concept of natural selection, but also a definition of 
what evolution is.  Evolution is a kind of change that relies upon variation, 
competition and inheritance (Lewontin, 1970). Darwin produced this definition 
whilst trying to account for the diversity of life.  In this formulation, natural 
selection is the (statistical) outcome of these components operating over time.  
Time is present as inheritance implies generational turnover, competition is 
interaction, and initial variation must precede novelty: these are all events. 
 
It is important to understand that evolution is the label we attach to the outcome 
of the interaction of these components; evolution is not an essence in want of a 
definition (Popper, 1945).  Any system with these components can evolve as it 
enables a form of selection.  That means any such system can change in terms of 
the proportional representation of its individual members, just so long as there is 
variation, competition and inheritance (Webb, 2011). Since Darwin, the MS has 
recognized sources other than natural selection for evolution, understood as a 
population concept.  Thus the principal contribution of Darwin might be seen as a 
focus upon population thinking. 
 
Selection does not speak to the sources of variation or competition, and nor does 
it address the causes of inheritance.  But any explanation of evolution, within a 
system, would reasonably seek accounts of these matters.  Given that evolution 
can happen in any system that exhibits those properties multiple causes of 
variation, competition and inheritance will exist in the world.  But Darwin’s own 
focus was upon biological systems, and in particular in populations defined at the 
species level; hence natural selection.  Darwin was unable to deliver a total 
theory of the causes of the components of evolution in biological systems but the 
effort to do so continued as the discipline of evolutionary biology thrived. 
 
Uller and Laland set the agenda accordingly: 
 
(E)volutionary biology, a discipline charged with providing historical accounts of the 
properties of living beings, as well as an understanding of the processes that explain the 
origin of those properties.  Familiar phenomena that demand an evolutionary 
explanation include the fit of form and function (adaptation) and the evolution of 
reproductive isolation (speciation), but also many others, including the origin of novelty 
and the organization of biological systems, including genomes and ecosystems. (p.1) 
 
They characterize the discipline of evolutionary biology as a loosely organized 
endeavour with the process of evolution by natural selection as the common 
thread. But the biological reality that delivers variation, differential survival and 
inheritance, and therefore enables natural selection, is incredibly complex.  Their 
central claim is that evolutionary processes 'encompass causation at different 
levels of biological organization, from genes to ecosystems, and at different 
timescales" (p.1). 
 
Uller and Laland clearly see the discipline of evolutionary biology as one that 
seeks the causes of evolution’s components.  For ease of exposition one might 
readily state that evolutionary biology aims to understand the causes of 
evolution.  But, in this form we elide the causes of the components with the 
definition of what evolution is.  Variation, competition and inheritance must come 
into alignment for evolution to occur, but each can exist prior to that alignment. 
To reiterate, Darwinian evolution is not a cause, but rather an outcome.  The 
dynamics of such specific change are in want of fulsome explanation and that will 
become an historical account, where abstract historical transitions can be 
modelled.  Uller and Laland are clear on this and argue that these complexities 
lead to modelling solutions that must leave out much causal detail in order to 
capture a biological system. They caution that the decision about what to leave 
out is most important. 
 
What is left out, or has been removed, has been a core concern for those 
advancing the EES.  In part this is due to a reliance upon the historical analysis of 
the MS provided by Gould (Gould, 2002).  In his version, the discipline of 
evolutionary biology increasingly narrowed its view from the 1930s as 
Larmarckism, orthogenesis, saltationism and group selection were removed from 
the core theory of evolutionary biology.  This led to a focus upon natural selection 
and adaptation. 
 
Evolutionary biology today has to incorporate soft inheritance, saltational changes due 
to systemic mutations, and various types of genetic exchange and cooperation.  These 
all challenge the assumptions of the Modern Synthesis.  We believe that rather than 
trying to continue to work within the framework of a Synthesis that was made in the 
middle of the last century, we now need a new type of evolutionary theory, one that 
acknowledges Darwinian, Lamarckian and saltational processes. ((Jablonka and Lamb, 
2008): 394) 
 
Whilst there is a clear irony in exhorting scholars to abandon an outmoded mid 
20th century framework in favour of an 18th century one, the thrust of this new 
book, and many other EES writings, is that recent findings in biology give us 





My claim is that evolutionary biology is an on-going project that looks to account 
for the emergence of the relevant antecedent conditions for evolution to occur.  
All of the contributors to this book would agree with this.  Furthermore, the MS is 
a framework that facilitates this effort.  It is the adequacy of this framework that 
is in question. 
 
Evolutionary Causation clearly adheres to a Gouldian perspective, and focuses 
upon the introduction of population thinking, gene-centrism and the distinction 
between proximate and ultimate causation as the major causal contributions of 
the MS.  These introductions are thought to have excluded, or removed, 
developmental and individual-level considerations in the MS. 
 
In Chapter 11, Walsh claims that the debate between MS and EES scholars rests 
upon the removal of the individual from evolutionary biology by population 
thinking.  His argument is straightforward.  Darwin’s insight was that individuals’ 
struggle for life led to changes in lineages due to arrivals and departures within a 
population.  For Walsh this is a true cause of evolution.    
 
(T)here is one level of causation; all the causes of evolution are causes of arrival and 
departure (the 'struggle for life').  Yet, there are two discernible levels of effect.  There 
are effects on individual organisms (first order effects), and there are effects on the 
distribution of abstract trait types in a population (higher order effects).  Consequently, 
there are two wholly distinct kinds of evolutionary explanation. (p.238). 
 
First order explanations lack generality as they merely give detailed accounts of a 
current situation.  Higher order explanations resolve this as they capture 
available generality as an effect of a certain kind.  In evolution: 
 
The first order cause explanation describes the ways in which biological, ecological 
processes impinged on the lives, deaths, and reproductions of individual organisms, and 
how the aggregate of these in turn was realized (in) changes in trait structure...  This... 
has its limitations.  It does not tell us, for example, how sensitive the change in trait 
structure is to variations in individual causes of living and dying.  For that we need to 
offer the sort of higher order effect explanation we find in Modern Synthesis population 
thinking. (p.234) 
 
This last is achieved by seeing the population as an ensemble of abstract traits - 
Fisher's solution - these traits then get fitness parameters to measure relative 
growth rates enabling us to explain relative frequencies.  Walsh sees these as self 
contained, complete explanations that are complementary and non-competing. 
 
Up to this point Walsh is in accord with the view of evolutionary biology as a 
discipline concerned with the antecedent conditions for evolution.   However, he 
moves on to discuss Mayr’s rendition of the proximate-ultimate distinction (PUD) 
(Mayr, 1961).  The outcome of which appears to be that “'proximate causes,' 
those individual-level processes that cause organisms severally to have the traits 
they have, do not appear in evolutionary explanations." (p.239).  Walsh then 
endorses an earlier statement of Laland’s (Laland et al., 2011) that proximate 
mechanisms both shape and respond to selection. 
 
This argument is a central piece of the EES position.  Uller and Laland (Chapter 1) 
relate PUD to Mayr's strong commitment to population thinking rather than what 
they call transformational or developmental explanations in evolutionary biology 
(Sober, 1984).  Transformational accounts are aggregation accounts of a 
population, looking at individual differences one at a time to account for 
population structure; this is contrasted with variational explanations which rely 
upon capacities that get you into a population, i.e. selection based accounts.  As 
Sober points out: 
 
Lamarck’s theory was developmental.  It explained the evolution of species by laying 
down a sequence of stages through which life forms are constrained to pass.  Species 
evolve because the organisms in them are gradually modified.  In contrast, Darwin’s 
theory of the evolution of species is not developmental.  Darwin explained change in a 
species by a mechanism that permits (and.. even requires) stasis in organisms.  In 
addition, the Darwinian paradigm views evolution as opportunistic, not preprogrammed.  
Selectional theories and developmental theories have fundamentally different 
explanatory structures. (pp. 148-149) 
 
The standard reading of Mayr is that he saw developmental processes as 
proximate. Mayr (1961), in an example drawn from migration, precisely says that 
the genetic disposition of a bird is an ultimate cause, a disposition introduced by 
natural selection.  But this is not to say that the operation of the genes, and their 
role in growth and development, is anything other than proximate.  Thus Mayr 
can be seen as arguing that the population of birds (a migrating species) is made 
up of individuals with disposition to migrate due to selection.  Evolution has 
occurred as a change from an ancestral state of only a few birds with this 
disposition to a majority share.  Nonetheless, the causes of individual variation on 
this disposition are not without interest, they are just logically separable (Dickins 
and Barton, 2012).  Given this, Sober’s dichotomy strikes me more as emphasis 
than insight.  These are two parts of evolutionary biology, but not two parts of 
evolution. 
 
Uller and Laland would disagree with this last statement.  Their claim is that PUD 
has been used to carve a consensus about what constitutes satisfactory 
evolutionary explanations (historical and functional accounts) and which do not 
(mechanistic and developmental accounts).  Their strong feeling is that PUD 
makes "all of the sustained directionality in evolution (come) from fitness 
differences between genotypes, or natural selection" (p.3). For Uller and Laland 
PUD may be inadvertently ruling out legitimate alternative evolutionary 
explanations including the role of developmental processes.  These processes, 
they claim, have been seen as irrelevant for explanations of phenotypic evolution.  
But, if we were Mayr and supportive colleagues, we would say phenotypes do not 
evolve, populations do. 
 
How are we to make sense of this?  Uller and Laland use an example of social 
learning in killer whales enabling fit to local feeding ecologies.  Behavioural 
plasticity and social learning enable what they term adaptive directionality, 
challenging the view of natural selection as exclusive in this domain: in effect, 
behaviour is directed to a solution to a locally contingent problem, and this 
affects what selection has to operate over.  This idea is close to orthogenesis, but 
the direction of evolution is affected by the action of individuals as in niche 
construction (Chapter 7). This does not imply hidden, or intrinsic design in 
evolution.  In this example, different local contingencies might lead to different 
solutions.  Uller and Laland locate accounts like this within transformational 
explanations and claim that a variational account would not invoke environmental 
influence on how traits originate and are inherited.  This example nicely 
demonstrates the laser focus that the EES has upon the phenotype.  Their 
question is not “is this population, so characterized, a product of the kind of 
change labelled evolution?”  Rather, it is “what are the causes of individual trait 
variation?”  Because they know that trait variation can play into evolution, in the 
presence of competition and inheritance, there is an awareness of possible, 
downstream evolutionary effects.  But, the EES is apt to conflate these two kinds 
of process. 
 
Not only is the killer whale an example of conflation it is also an example of a 
missing level in the parsing of explanatory tasks.  The example relies on social 
learning to introduce trait variation enabling adaptation to a local ecology.  What 
is not asked, and what would occur to those pursuing a variational account, is for 
an account of the selection for social learning.  Any such account would 
undoubtedly include discussion of relevant ecological variability and the role of 
data led tracking solutions for robustness.  Thus the authors refer to phenomena 
that can be accommodated within standard selection models. Uller and Laland 
address this criticism, and suggest this view is a reformulation of what requires 
an evolutionary explanation and they suggest three problems with it: 
 
1) It appears to deliver an incomplete explanation, as it does not drill into specific 
historical contingencies for specific populations of killer whales. 
 
2) Strict exclusion of proximate causes "appears to confer on genes causal and 
informational privilege in development” (p.5) and misses that genes have their 
effects through development. 
 
3) The reformulation relies on the idea that variation, differential fitness and 
heredity are autonomous processes.   
 
The accusation of conflation may seem churlish in light of this riposte.  Surely the 
manner in which PUD is used in the MS is merely an epistemic strategy?  Perhaps 
an overly strong commitment to that strategy could cause scientists to miss 
ontological detail and at least impoverish their understanding of the natural 
world.  After all, the mess of nature is a dynamic swirl of development and 
population changes emerging from a multitude of interactions up and down the 
biological hierarchy.  Uller and Laland try to capture this idea by advocating an 
entangled model that they do not really explain (p.6).  That PUD is an epistemic 
strategy is not a criticism, but it should be noted that it is drawn from an 
ontological point about what evolution is.  Development simply does not fit that 
category, but, of course, both belong to the set labelled change. 
 
The reference to privileging of the gene is to another aspect of the MS, its 
purported gene-centrism. Dayan and colleagues (Chapter 5) declare that 
understanding "the origin of biological variation is one of the principal goals of 
biology" (p.81).  The MS was directed at this task but not only focused upon the 
gene as the "sole means of inheritance but also as the primary determinant of 
phenotypes themselves" (p.81).  This has led to evolution being studied in terms 
of genetic variation but according to the authors we should really be interested in 
the evolution of traits (note, again, this use of evolution as a concept of 
emergence). 
 
Dayan et al. claim that the MS linked genes and traits in a one-to-one, and linear 
fashion, and as deterministic genotype-to-phenotype mapping.   This is 
contrasted with phenotypic plasticity, a live topic in recent years and they 
“suggest that we are on the cusp of integrating these diverse factors into a 
framework that predicts how environmentally induced variation interacts with 
genetic variation to influence traits and evolutionary trajectories" (p.81). 
 
For Dayan et al., the idea of a direct relationship between genotype and 
phenotype, or a genetic blueprint, is central to the MS.  This is often presented as 
a simplifying heuristic - the genotype-to-phenotype map – which they see as 
naively giving causal priority to natural selection among genetic variants in 
research.  Thus the gene is privileged.  Yet, somewhat confusingly, they then 
discuss a few key population and quantitative genetic studies that make mapping 
assumptions and claim this as a useful heuristic, but one that does not capture 
the complexity of nature.  This seems to be an odd criticism as heuristics are 
specifically designed to avoid complexity and to deliver a utility efficiently.  GWAS 
work revealing underwhelming heritability estimates is focused upon along with a 
number of interpretations of missing heritability - but many of these possible 
explanations are in fact genetic (p.83) as well as epistatic and epigenetic, leading 
to the suggestion that the genotype-to-phenotype map may be too complex or 
dynamic to be of much use.  This may be a just comment about some models, 
but it is only a comment about models, not about reality.  Of course, what this 
leads to is the need to think about the role of the environment and gene by 
environment interactions.  “The consequences of GxE are twofold.  First, by 
providing the variation for plasticity on which selection can act, GxE permits the 
evolution of plasticity itself ...  Perhaps more importantly, the existence of GxE 
means that genetic variation is expressed differently across environmental 
contexts.” (p.86). 
 
So, just what does “gene centric" or "gene centrism" mean?  All of the 
commentary from Dayan et al. makes clear that there are things interacting with 
genes, augmenting gene action etc. but all of those processes only make sense in 
light of the gene.  Genes are fundamental constraints, in that they are essential 
components, even in these non-linear models.  What is relevant is some sort of 
genetic activity that arises from the base sequence, and can be modified via 
mutation – which in fact make mutations more fundamental for a variational 
account.  Moreover, the idea that genes are a part of a developmental process 
has never been denied within the MS, and Dayan et al. conspicuously fail to 
derive a citation to counter this.  Indeed, perhaps the most notable gene-centrist, 
Dawkins, directly advocates the role of genes as catalysts in his seminal book 
((Dawkins, 1989) p.240).  In my view, the use of the term privilege is always a 
red flag - it might be better read as explanatory priority, which is an epistemic 
constraint rather than an ontological commitment.  But again this is an 
epistemological strategy born of an ontological commitment.  What this means is 
that there is genetic primacy in some causal developmental chain, but this does 
not make genes a sufficient condition for the final phenotype, only necessary.  
Metaphorically, we might see the genotype as the geological layers beneath a 
detailed map with layers for terrain, and supported ecosystems etc.  There is 
causality here, and there is the opportunity for abstract models to make 
predictive jumps across layers. 
 
All this to one side, the focus for Dayan et al. has again been on the emergence 
of the phenotype, not upon evolution.  Their interest in plasticity is not 
necessarily a challenge to the MS.  To this end, the authors discuss the standard 
robustness interpretation of plasticity as a data led response to environmental 
change that enables the preservation of the genome (Meyers and Bull, 2002), but 
they point out that phenotypic plasticity might mediate the relationship between 
selection and genetic variation.  But surely there is no contradiction here?  The 
idea that plasticity might buffer the genome against change is a mediation 
between selection and the genome that would allow directional selection 
assuming plasticity mechanisms were susceptible to mutation.  In other words, 
buffering does not have to be total and it would be odd if it were.  Rather 
buffering introduces a useful time lag, but not a total exclusion for more systemic 
change.  Dayan et al. understand this and also the role of this in changing 
population dynamics and the outcomes of evolution. 
 
This leads Dayan et al. to genetic accommodation where phenotypes are leaders 
and genes are followers (West-Eberhard, 2003).  This is described in standard MS 
terms – so the choices are that either a mutation leads to a new phenotype, or a 
novel phenotype is delivered by previously unexpressed plastic response, and 
then selection refines all this by operating on various genetic loci.  The speed of 
evolution can be rapid as plasticity can enable an alternative phenotype to 
emerge in multiple individuals in the population and that gives more options for 
selection to operate over.  This is all packaged as the environment playing a role 
in both the production of and selection on a trait. But this is not in fact so 
because plasticity is dependent, in a causal way, upon underlying genes that in 
turn can deliver alternative and (in this instance) novel phenotypes.  That 
plasticity is conditionally expressed under some probability distribution (Nettle 
and Bateson, 2015).  When those conditions are met, the alternative phenotype 
is expressed, but it is not solely caused by those conditions, but rather it awaits 
those conditions.  None of this is in contradiction to neutral evolution theories 
that allow for genetic robustness but also the chance of phenotypically delivered 
utility in future, changed environments, which is often packaged as evolvability 
(Wagner, 2005, 2008; Pigliucci, 2008).  Evolvability simply means that there is a 
possibility of later selection and evolution. 
 
A key thing to take home here is that if you choose not to think about a possible 
role for selection or to address any patterning in phenotypic plasticity, then 
phenotypic response to the environment is irregular and non-law like.  There is 
no real data available to support this hypothesis, but one could choose to believe 
that this is because it has not yet been collected.  You could even see this as a 
limit of our current scientific methods.  At this stage, such ideas are close to 
skyhooks (Dennett, 1995).  Skyhooks are concepts, usually hypothesized 
mechanisms that do not build on lower levels of organization, but rather impose 
complexity from on high.  As such they are profoundly anti-reductionist but also 
leave us with miraculous questions to resolve about their origins. 
 
In Chapter 6, Sultan aims to re-evaluate the idea of genetic control as a causal 
principle.  She tells us that developmental outcomes are shaped by multiple types 
of information and states that "phenotypes emerge from the real-time regulatory 
interactions of the evolved genotype with transient environmental and/or 
epigenetic influences that occur at timescales from within a generation to several 
of many generations" (p.117).  This reveals two things.  First, the genotype has a 
data role that can be regulated by other inputs.  This suggests that the genotype 
provides an information context for environmental and other inputs.  Programs 
operate to deliver this kind of functionality, and yet Sultan is eager to move away 
from the view of reaction norms as a part of developmental programs.  Second, 
no effort is made to think about why the timescale variation is in place within 
these mechanisms.  She sees all of this delivering distributed control of the 
emerging phenotype. 
 
Sultan sees this rich developmental context as decoupling phenotypic outcomes 
from specific allelic differences and altering selection (p.119).  I think what is 
meant is that the allelic variation is not directly visible in all circumstances 
because it is expressed differently under different conditions etc. This will impact 
upon selection dynamics for the genotype but it is hardly a revelation and it is 
hardly a challenge to the genetic program idea.  In drawing to a conclusion 
Sultan comments: 
 
Now the key challenge is to understand how the stable, continuous DNA information 
stream that most robustly tracks evolutionary lineage and diversification is altered by 
selective evolution, when that DNA stream comprises only a partial, context-dependent 
component of selective causation - that is, when fitness variation reflects genotype-
environment entanglement rather than genetic differences alone. (p. 119) 
 
This sounds revolutionary but it is not.  All Sultan has noted really is that the 
expression of the phenotype involves multiple causes, which all evolutionary 
biologists have always thought, and that this adds noise to GxE speculations.  
The gene is still a necessary and context-setting condition for phenotypic 
development. Development is patterned as a result of this, but also because 
natural selection would not lead to truly random developmental outcomes, and 




Uller and Laland begin Evolutionary Causation with a caution about models.  
Models can be understood as connecting theory to phenomena (De Regt, 2017).  
As such models are derived from theoretical principles but are abstract 
representations exploiting similarities with the real world (Giere, 2004).  Models 
bring phenomena into theory and they are a mechanism of explanation.  When 
this is done, according to both De Regt and Giere, we have gained scientific 
understanding of the phenomenon at hand.  In many ways, Uller and Laland are 
asserting that natural selection is a principal theoretical contribution of 
evolutionary biology, which can be used to generate models at various different 
levels of biological organization.  But, this contribution can be understood 
differently within distinct theoretical frameworks as a consequence of the kind of 
causation invoked.  By implication, the argument is that the MS was a partial 
modelling effort that excluded various aspects of the biological totality.  The 
further implication is that the concepts of causation developed within the MS 
modelling effort were also partial, and perhaps wrong. 
 
The MS is indeed a framework to deliver models.  Its core conceit is the definition 
of evolution given by Darwin, and it has relied upon natural selection to generate 
hypotheses.  But the MS has not been unaware of other ways to produce 
patterned population change, and drift is always to be considered for example.  
What natural selection does is enable the construction of falsifiable hypotheses 
about particular biological systems.  As such, the MS might be seen as a viable 
research program, following Lakatos.  As a viable research program, new 
discoveries about the origin of variation, or competition or inheritance are to be 
dealt with – do they challenge the hard-core axioms of the program, or can they 
be accommodated, even with tweaks to the protective belt of day-to-day 
empirical work?  In order to challenge new predictions must be made.   
 
I think the empirical work referenced by the EES, and in Evolutionary Causation, 
presents useful, protective belt challenges to the research program of the MS.  
But these challenges are really around quibbles with regard to specific models.  
Thus the EES are, in effect, simply arguing for lists of different constraints and 
considerations in the abstractions made in order to claim greater or more 
comprehensive coverage.  That quickly becomes a moot point because the 
ambitions of the modellers will vary.  Nonetheless the MS should welcome a fully 
worked theory of the emergence of the phenotype, of variation and of inheritance 
and so all of this work needs to be considered.  What is not presented is a real 
challenge to the core axioms of the MS.  One possible reason for this is that, to 
date, the EES has relied on partial histories of the transitions in evolutionary 
biology, and claims made about only a handful of contributors.  This amounts to 
an inductive attempt to characterize a framework from a small sample of studies.  
History and philosophy of science has been wise to this problem for some time 
(De Regt, 2017).  This approach is unlikely to make full contact with the discipline 
as practiced, nor the many available interpretations of the literature.  Indeed, one 
might wonder whether the disciplinary backgrounds and task demands of the 
contributing authors determines where they choose to focus in the entangled 
mess of nature. 
 
Whilst I clearly take a critical view of the EES I do think the arguments they 
present have a role to play.  It is good practice to stop, every now and then, and 
to inspect one’s own core assumptions; and, it is certainly good practice to look 
to new findings in biology and be certain sure they make sense in light of extant 
frameworks because at some point they may not.  The contributors to this book 
will make any reader do this.  But ultimately the EES seems focused upon a 
variety of complex feedback effects in evolution that are predominantly the realm 
of ecology.  Those effects are important and require parsing and explaining.  The 
EES provides no new tools for doing this, nor any novel predictions, and the 
discussion of causation in this book merely conflates the phenomena with 
explanation.  My suspicion is that true and productive challenges to evolutionary 
biology will arise from efforts directed toward the origins of life itself, and 





I am indebted to Ben Dickins, for many useful conversations on the topics raised 
by this book, and to Norman Johnson for useful editorial commentary.  As usual, 
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